I. Intro
The problem of global inequality 2 has led many commentators to consider the possibility of global justice. One important voice in this debate is the communitarian, objecting to global justice on the ground that justice is a virtue within political communities, not between them. 3 While this debate continues on, however, the world has changed. Globalization, a social process in which space is essentially eliminated as a factor in social relations, 4 is lifting relationships out of the strictly territorial into the "global" or meta-territorial. The political and legal significance of this change is immediate and fundamental: as the space in which we conduct our social relations changes, our manner of regulating those relations changes as well.
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For the purposes of this paper, globalization also means we must re-examine the nature of community, at the national and at the "global" level. As I will argue below, globalization is changing the nature of social relations towards the emergence at the 2 Global inequality can be framed as a problem between states or between individuals within states. Both perspectives illuminate important aspects of the problem, although there are obvious theoretical and policy differences between each view. In this paper I am speaking of inequality as experienced between individuals who, through globalization, are suddenly or more dramatically aware of each other's differing circumstances. 3 See infra section II.B. 4 See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, global level of elements of the sort of community which communitarians cite as a necessary prerequisite for justice. Thus globalizations is paving the way for global justice, even on communitarian terms.
In Part II of this paper, I will briefly discuss the disagreement over the relationship between global society and global justice at the heart of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate over global justice, and survey the essential elements of the communitarian position, relying principally on the work of Walzer and
Miller. In Part III, I suggest four ways in which globalization is changing the debate over global justice, by creating elements of community at the global level. In extending globally our capacity to help or to harm, globalization is bringing about what Rawls calls the circumstances of justice at the global level, which has implications for global community. Moreover, globalization is creating a community of knowledge, and the sort of shared practices and understandings which are essential for communitarian justice.
Finally, I conclude in Part IV with some observations about where these developments take us.
II. Global Society and Global Justice
The question of global justice requires us to consider the relationship between justice and society, in this case global society. 6 Can we speak of obligations of justice 6 In this discussion, I am not speaking of global society in the "society of states" manner, although that is another way the term can be used. To be more precise, communitarians speak of the absence of community at the global level, as something "deeper" than mere society. Communitarians maintain that although we may share a common humanity and mutual interests, we do not share obligations of justice unless we already share certain kinds of social relations, usually identified with the nation, and generally expressed in terms of shared traditions, practices and understandings. 10 Put another way, communitarians might grant the existence of some kind of global society, consisting of associations for mutual self-interest, but distinguishable from true "community," which requires something more, reserving "justice" for the latter.
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Since the concept of global justice is congenial to cosmopolitans, I want to focus in this paper on the communitarian position. If we can find a way to satisfy, even in part, the requirements imposed by this view, then we can see a way forward towards global justice on cosmopolitan or communitarian grounds. As will be discussed further below, my main contention is that globalization itself suggests a way forward. B.
Justice and Community
The communitarian position is that global justice is not possible because we lack the sort of social relations on a global level, which make justice possible in domestic society. 12 Only in domestic societies do we find community: the shared practices, traditions and understandings which help create individual identity, and the social solidarity and sense of common purpose necessary to support the sacrifices and obligations of justice. Moreover, for these essential relationships to work, it is necessary that we prefer each other in the distribution of resources, which also undercuts the notion of global justice outside these communities. Unless these kinds of social relationships exist globally, there is no possibility of global justice.
Communitarian theories of justice presuppose social cooperation, or society.
However, society by itself is not enough for community, or justice. 13 That something more is generally expressed as a sense of common purpose, or solidarity. 14 Walzer's account of community, for example, relies on a distinction between associations and communities, which turns on the question of self-interest. Society can exist associationally whenever two or more gather for the same reason, but community exists, 12 I reserve for another day the various theoretical objections one can raise about communitarianism, such as the question of whether social criteria drawn from domestic society are equally applicable to the global level. They might be, but they might not be. Global society may not resemble domestic society in all respects, but constitute a society nonetheless, in much the same way that international law does not resemble domestic law in all respects, but we are now comfortable that it is law all the same. In either case, the point needs to be argued separately, and it usually is not. 
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Communitarians offer two basic kinds of arguments for why national community is in fact important to the pursuit of justice, and justified partiality therefore incompatible with cosmopolitan justice. First, Miller argues that national community is the necessary basis for solidarity, which is necessary to support the individual sacrifices which justice demands. 23 In a similar sense, Walzer's notion of the common good is necessary for the sacrifices of justice, since almost be definition justice will be invoked when someone has failed, or perceives themselves as having failed, to secure their individual self-interest.
Second, it is only within particular communities that you can determine what justice consists of, and who owes it to whom. For Miller, it is only within national communities that you can determine which people are to have their needs considered and 20 Walzer, Spheres 313. 21 Communitarians also object that even within these communities, justice is not their "first virtue," but more remedial in nature, responding to break-downs in community. Buchanan, "Assessing" 853. 22 Miller, On Nationality 65-79, 104-8. His larger point is a particularist one: we must pursue justice as we find ourselves, not as we would like to imagine ourselves, and we find ourselves embedded in communities, particularly national communities, whose wellbeing matters to us. This suggests the larger argument that the communitarian sort of ethical particularism is simply more accurate in capturing how we actually reason morally, than the universalist attempt at disembodied rationality. Advocates of communitarian justice must face challenges posed by the empirical reality of disagreement over social understandings, the evolution of new understandings, 24 Miller, "Ethical Significance" 661. 25 Walzer, Spheres 313. 26 It is not clear, however, that cosmopolitan approaches to global justice are incompatible with special relationships. Martha Nussbaum argues that "[n]one of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we can and should give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of religious and national belonging." "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in J. Brown (ed)., For Love of Country (Boston: Beacon Press 1996), p. 135; see also Charles Beitz, "Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System," in Chris Brown (ed.) Political Restructuring in Europe (London and New York: Routledge 1994), pp. 29-30 (cosmopolitanism can and should take into account role of communities in human flourishing -the disagreement is only over how). We are no stranger to multiple, overlapping, sometimes conflicting categories of obligationthink of obligations to family and to country, for example -and if the mere fact of the former doesn't defeat the possibility of the latter, then overlapping commitments are not by themselves obstacles to global justice. This does assume, however, that we can articulate and follow principles for balancing the conflicting interests presented by conflict among the different levels -an assumption which philosophers accuse legal writers on justice of being too ready to make. See Lawrence C. As a threshold matter, it is important to understand how globalization is getting us to society before we look at how it is getting us to community. I cannot do more than suggest a way to approach this question within the scope of this paper, and will do so utilizing Rawls' concept of the circumstances of justice. In this view, global social space has certain key features which make global justice both possible, and necessary, leading
to an understanding of globalization as consisting of numerous cooperative schemes for mutual advantage. 35 For a contractarian this cooperation may be adequate to make justice relevant, but for communitarians such social cooperation is not by itself enough to establish community as they define it. However, such cooperation is a fundamental prerequisite of community, and can in certain cases also lead to the emergence of community, as I will suggest below.
Rawls' Circumstances of Justice
The circumstances of justice are those conditions of our situation which make cooperation both possible, and necessary. 36 Where they obtain, and where we find such cooperation, justice is relevant. What are those circumstances?
Rawls divides them into two categories. The first, objective circumstances, are three: a moderate scarcity of resources, a shared geographical territory, and a capacity to help or harm each other. In other words, there is not enough to go around for everything we want to do; we are going to be looking for these resources in the same places; and we have the capacity to unite to defeat one another's goals, or work together to achieve many of them.
The second, subjective, set of circumstances consists of two: people are mutually disinterested, and they have conflicting claims. In other words, we are not generally altruistic -we want what we want; and to get it, we go after what each other has.
Because of these five circumstances, we are led to cooperation as the most rational means towards achieving our individual ends. This, in essence, is society, which Rawls defines as a cooperative ventures for mutual advantage. The principles which guide the distribution of the fruits of this venture are principles of justice.
Globalization and the Global Circumstances of Justice
Globalization is bringing about the same circumstances of justice at the global level, which Rawls described at the domestic level. To begin with, there is of course the same basic scarcity of resources at the global level. Through globalization, people are increasingly competing for these resources on a global scale in a shared territory: our planet. That they are mutually disinterested and assert conflicting claims over these resources does not need to be argued.
a. Capacity to Help
Because of globalization, in particular its technical and economic revolutions, we increasingly find that we have a capacity to effectively respond to the needs and concerns of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information, power, capital, or public opinion, in ways that hitherto we could not. This capacity to harm each other globally is an important element in creating a sense of solidarity, understood as a sense of responsibility for one other. Through our economic interdependence, we have to take seriously the possibility that we are contributing to the socioeconomic circumstances of others, a basic criteria of community. 42 Our responsibility over the effects, even attenuated, of our own conduct at the global level, is a rationale for global justice that, it has been suggested, transcends the entire cosmopolitan-communitarian divide.
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Together, these global circumstances of justice, especially our capacity to both help and harm each other, make justice both possible and necessary at the global level.
Moreover, in their contribution to the creation of solidarity, understood as fellowresponsibility, they lay the foundation for global community. I would now like to turn more directly to two further aspects of globalization which bring us even closer to meeting the criteria communitarians lay down for obligations of justice. 
Global Community of Knowledge
Globalization is creating a community of knowledge. Through globalization, we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of people in other parts of the world. 44 Such knowledge satisfies a basic requirement for community -that we have the capacity to know another's needs, concerns and preferences. 45 This kind of knowledge is also an important element in the communitarian argument for community as a prerequisite of justice. Community matters to justice in part because it is within community that we have the knowledge of each other necessary for justice to work at all. This knowledge forms the basis for the social determination of "need" and "whose needs count" which Miller cites, as well as the basis for Walzer's shared understandings. In this way, knowing this about each other is the basis for creating solidarity, that leap of the moral imagination which says that your concerns are my concerns.
Community of Risks
One specific type of shared knowledge important to globalization is the growing recognition of the risks we share as human beings on this planet, and our shared interest in addressing those risks. In order to see a sense of community emerge from the mere recognition of shared risks, however, we need to look at how we are responding. This necessitates a look at the modern global regulatory system.
C. Shared Traditions, Practices and Understandings
This community of knowledge and risk is also, increasingly, becoming a community of shared traditions, practices and understandings. These grow, both spontaneously and institutionally, out of our perception of shared needs and interests, of our capacity to help and to harm, and our awareness of each other's plight -in short, our understanding of globalization as interlocking our fates.
It would be a mistake to understate the reality of conflict over social practices and values, which contributes at least at the rhetorical level to actual political conflicts 47 Id. 48 See Simma and Paulus, "International Community," p. 272 (listing bases for a dialogue on a minimal set of common values 
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I would like to focus on two particular aspects of contemporary globalization, markets and meta-state institutions, as particularly indicative of the emergence of global community, at least in their respective realms.
Market Society as a Shared Practice
To the extent that globalization is creating a global market society, this in itself is another shared practice, albeit a very complex one, contributing to a community of interests. The advanced capitalist form of market society practiced by the most developed countries is not, of course, implemented in identical ways in all market societies (indeed, not even uniformly within this category, if one compares U.S. versus
Western European capitalism).
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Nevertheless, market society has certain attributes -the need for bureaucratic regulation, recognition of private property, civil courts, to name a few -which by virtue of their pronounced spill-over effects contribute to shared interests among participants.
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Not the least of these is an interest in considering institutions which supplement and mitigate the rigors of capitalism, compensating the "losers" through some form of wealth transfer. In this sense, even the anti-globalization protests contribute to the community globalization is creating, insofar as they take up one part of a larger global debate over the most humane ideology for global market society.
Shared Understanding of the Need for Meta-State Institutions
Perhaps the strongest force for, and evidence of, an emerging global limited community involves our recognition of a shared need to look to institutions beyond the state in order to frame an adequate social response to many of the problems and challenges we face. In other words, the need for increased global governance is itself a 55 Indeed, markets have been touted on instrumental grounds precisely because they can facilitate efficient transfers among people who do not share conceptions of the good. Globalization's many aspects are together pushing us towards increased cooperation at the meta-state level. In Rawls' account of the circumstances of justice, our response to these circumstances is to enter into systems of social cooperation for mutual advantage. Through this cooperation we create the "basic structure," the institutions which we create to allocate resources and opportunities, and which thereby directly affect our life prospects. By leading us to create new institutions and shift responsibility for many social allocations to the meta-state level, globalization is creating a global basic structure. This move to the meta-state level could be seen as merely creating global society, which in the communitarian view does not entail global community. However, I would 57 For an interesting analysis of the issues presented by the possibility of a global basic structure, see Simon Caney, "The Global Basis Structure: Its Nature and Moral Relevance," unpublished paper on file with the author. 58 "The institutions and quasi-formal arrangements affecting persons life prospects throughout the world are increasingly international ones -IFI's, MNC's, the G-8, the WTO -and the restricted Rawlsian view fails to assess the moral character of those institutions." Jones, Global Justice 8. Miller with respect to how we manage conflicts over "shared" understandings in domestic communities, and suggests how globalization may be creating a broader shared understanding with respect to how we manage conflicting claims.
In domestic communities, one answer to the problem of conflict is to change the level of analysis to "understandings about understandings," or "shared public cultures," which might help resolve the problem but also casts the community's identity in a different light. When viewed this way, it seems communitarians are actually linking justice to a kind of shared institutional culture, rather than a true community of shared primary beliefs. Communitarians mention time or history as a necessary ingredient in community for two reasons: first, and less importantly, as a substitute for a more thorough explanation of the formation of communal bonds (a sort of "waving of the magic wand"); and second, and more significantly, because a period of time was necessary under pre-globalization conditions for social contact and social knowledge to attain the sort of cumulative intensity necessary for the creation of more intimate bonds. As we have noted, globalization today is characterized by the elimination of time and space as factors in many significant human social relations. Because of globalization, we would therefore expect to see this process occur at a much faster rate, meaning that a common life might be shaped more rapidly during periods of globalization than otherwise thought possible.
Thus it is quite possible to see global community emerge in a matter of decades. 64 See, e.g., Walzer, Just and Unjust 54; Miller, On Nationality 23-24.
IV.
Conclusion
In global relations we see, both inter-subjectively and at the regulatory level, the constitutive elements of a limited global community emerging. One finds that globalization itself is in the process of creating a new global identity, consisting of shared understandings, practices and traditions capable of supporting obligations of justice.
Members of this global society are increasingly aware of each other's needs and circumstances, increasingly capable of effectively addressing these needs, and increasingly contributing to these circumstances in the first place. They find themselves involved in the same global market society, and together these members look to the same organizations, especially those at the meta-state level, to provide regulatory approaches to addressing problems of global social policy. These organizations, in addressing such needs, are involved in allocating the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, such as rights, opportunities, privileges, membership and resources, activities that have been traditionally understood in the domestic sphere to make justice both relevant and necessary.
All of this is not to argue that global community has emerged fully formed, with the richness and force of the national community. However, in important ways we can begin to speak of limited degrees of community, or spheres of justice to borrow Walzer's phrase, with respect to different issues, institutions or sets of social relations within the global social space. Thus we can speak of "limited global community" as embracing that level of "community" necessary to support relations of justice, even if it does not manifest that level of community necessary to speak of "global community" in the fullest communitarian sense.
It is in this sense that I have sought to establish that traditional communitarian objections to the possibility of global justice are being weakened by globalization itself.
In doing so, I have deliberately refrained from arguing for a particular substantive view of global justice. My goal, instead, has been to suggest why globalization is itself changing the very nature of the phenomena which moral and political theories of global justice seek to explore. I would be satisfied to establish a link between our evaluation of the claims of communitarian theory, and our empirical evaluation of the social changes of globalization.
If we go a step farther and accept the idea of global justice, the work ahead is to elaborate appropriate principles of justice for a global community. From a communitarian perspective, this requires comparative research, a sort of "anthropology of justice." Then we can proceed to identifying appropriate institutions to deliver on this commitment, and devising the political strategies to see them implemented.
